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Serrano II: Equal Access to School
Resources and Fiscal Neutrality-
A View From Washington State
by MICHAEL E. ANDREWS*
Introduction
In recent years much attention has been accorded the concept of district
power equalizing (I)PE). Many hope that a system of educational subsidiza-
tion based upon DPE could solve the crisis in school financing that
plagues virtually every state in America. This is an understandable but
ultimately vain hope.1 Serrano v. Priest2 (Serrano I and Serrano 11) and
similar cases grapple with the problem of distributing educational resources
through the proxy of an assault upon the method of school revenue pro-
duction; they offer a solution based on the premise that an equitable system
of school-related taxation will, ipso facto, yield a fair distribution of educa-
tional resources. But these two separable concerns are, in fact, not so neatly
correlated as the California Supreme Court assumed them to be.
A better approach to solving the school financing problem would treat
separately the twin concerns of taxational and educational equity; it is the
purpose of this paper to sketch the broad outlines of such an approach. Part I
reviews the decision of the California Supreme Court in Serrano I as it
relates to these concerns and the manner in which the state district court on
remand (with subsequent Supreme Court approval in Serrano 11) attempted
* B.S., 1965, Stanford University and St. Louis University; J.D., 1973, University of
Washington. Member, Washington Bar. The author wishes to advise readers that, as a trial
lawyer representing petitioners in major school finance litigation pending before the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, this commentary is necessarily written from a position of advocacy.
1. DPE is an inadequate means of dealing with the school financing problem because, as
this commentary will later show, it fails both adequately to account for variations in the
educational needs of school children and to guarantee any minimum level of expenditure for
those needs. See notes 55-72 and accompanying text supra. The inadequacies of this particular
solution and those similar to it have, however, been encouraged by the rejection of earlier
attacks on the school finance problem that were based on the concept of educational need. See,
e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) [lack of judicially manageable standards made controversy
nonjusticiable].
2. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (Serrano I);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano II), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. June 15, 1977).
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to utilize the concept of fiscal neutrality to resolve these problems. This part
then concludes with a review of the unique equal protection analysis utilized
in Serrano i and the potential impact of this analysis on school resource
development. Part II provides a review and critique of the school finance
schemes suggested in Serrano i- as constitutionally acceptable alternatives
to the existing system of school finance. Part III briefly discusses a suggest-
ed legislative response to Serrano I-the key feature of which is the
separation of revenue production from distribution.
I. Serrano I and H: An Overview
A. Serrano I
The evil that John Serrano Jr. set out to cure was the conditioning of
a child's access to essential public school resources upon his own wealth or
that of his neighbors within that school district. The plaintiff-petitioners in
Serrano I thus alleged that:
As a direct result of the financing scheme .. .substantial dis-
parities in the quality and extent of availability of educational
opportunities exist and are perpetuated among the several school
districts of the State . . . .The educational opportunities made
available to children attending public schools in the Districts, in-
cluding plaintiff children, are substantially inferior to educational
opportunities made available to children attending public schools in
many other districts of the State . .. .3
In short, it was contended that the California school financing system
discriminated among school children on the basis of wealth.
The defendants responded in three ways. They argued: (1) that the
"basic aid ' 4 portion of state-provided revenues was allocated equally
among all pupils regardless of local wealth and that state "equalization
aid" 5 afforded proportionally greater benefits to property-poor school dis-
3. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
4. "'Basic state aid' consists of a flat grant to each district of $125 per pupil per year,
regardless of the relative wealth of the district." Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 593,487 P.2d at 1247, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 607. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17751, 17801 (West Supp. 1977) (current version at
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41790, 41800 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976)).
5. Equalization aid is distributed in inverse proportion to a district's wealth. To deter-
mine the amount of equalization aid a district will receive, the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction ascertains how much local property tax revenue would be generated if the district
levied a tax of $1 on each $100 of assessed valuation in elementary school districts and $.80 per
$100 in high school districts. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17702 (West Supp. 1977) (current version
at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41761 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976)). To that figure, the Superintendent
adds $125 per pupil basic aid grant. If the total of these two amounts is less than the foundation
program minimum for that district (minimum expenditure per pupil guaranteed by the state
legislature), the state contributes the difference. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17901, 17902 (West
Supp. 1977) (current version at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41810, 41811 (West Spec. Pamp. 1976)).
Equalization funds guarantee to the poorer districts a minimum amount of support, while
wealthier districts may not receive such assistance. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 593,487 P.2d at 1247,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 607. After Serrano I, the legislature made various changes in foundation levels
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tricts; (2) that neither the measure of assessed valuation per pupil nor the'
measure of expenditure per pupil necessarily indicated the relative wealth of
school districts or their residents; and (3) that "the wealth of a school
district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the families who live
there.''6 The court dismissed the first two contentions, observing that a
substantial part of a school district's budget was derived from local property
wealth and that property-poor districts could not produce as much school
revenue as property-rich districts even if the former taxed themselves at
much higher rates than the latter. 7 Because Serrano I was an appeal from
the granting of a general demurrer to the plaintiffs' complaint in the trial
court, 8 the state supreme court also dismissed the respondents' assertion that
district real property wealth per pupil and individual student (or student
family) poverty were uncorrelated. The court observed, "[t]he simple an-
swer to this argument is that plaintiffs have alleged that there is a correlation
between a district's per pupil assessed valuation and the wealth of its
residents, and we treat these material facts as admitted by the demurrers. '" 9
Thus, for procedural reasons only, the court in Serrano I accepted as true
the petitioners' original allegation that where one found a school district
with a low average real property assessed valuation per pupil one would
generally also find low average levels of individual wealth, and vice versa.
The court then discussed the "indispensable" role that education plays
in the modern industrial state. It asserted that this role has two significant
aspects: "[F]irst, education is a major determinant of an individual's
chances for economic and social success in our competitive society; second,
education is a unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his
participation in political and community life." 10 As a result of the unique
importance of education in our democratic society, the court in Serrano I
felt compelled to treat a child's right to a publicly provided education as a
"fundamental interest." 11 Having found such an interest, the court then was
required to utilize the "strict scrutiny" 12 standard of equal protection re-
view, thereby shifting the burden to the state to show a compelling interest
justifying the existing school finance system. Thus, the following conclu-
sions of the supreme court were before the trial court on remand:
(1) A child's right to public education in California is a fundamental
interest.
that affected the computation of equalization aid. See Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 742, 557 P.2d at
935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
6. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 600, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
7. See id. at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
8. Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
9. Id. at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
10. Id. at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
11. d. at 609, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
12. For a review of the developments in fundamental interests analysis, see San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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(2) The existing scheme for school finance in California invidiously
discriminated against the poor, provided petitioner's allegations were true.
(3) The plaintiff-petitioners were entitled to prove that there was a
strong positive correlation between school district real property wealth and
individual wealth. 13
B. The Proceedings on Remand: A Proxy Strategy
Yet, on remand the plaintiffs apparently made no showing of a correla-
tion between individual student wealth and district real property wealth. The
focus in the trial court in fact shifted from a concern for poor students and
low-wealth districts to a concern exclusively for the comparative disadvan-
tages of low-wealth vis-h-vis high wealth districts. The evidence would
indicate, however, that in California there is no reliable correlation between
school district real property wealth and personal wealth. 14 A study including
within its data base San Francisco, Oakland, and surrounding suburbs, for
example, shows that in the early 1970's nineteen percent of the families
residing in the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area earned less than
$3,000 per year; in the surrounding suburbs, however, only fourteen percent
of the families did. 15 These statistics indicate that the poor are where you
find them, which may or may not be in a property-poor school district.16
This lack of a demonstrably strong correlation between low property wealth
school districts and poor families may have encouraged plaintiffs' counsel to
abandon a direct attack on the original problem, the relation between a
school child's access to essential public school resources and that child's
wealth, and instead to adopt a proxy strategy.
13. In order to show that the state had invidiously discriminated against the poor, there
would have had to have been a showing by the petitioners that the poor were treated worse than
the non-poor by California's system of school finance. A showing that some poor people lived
in property-poor school districts, but were treated similarly, and that other poor people lived in
property-rich districts, would not suffice to meet this evidentiary burden, absent a showing that
the state prevented movement by the poor from property-poor districts to property-rich dis-
tricts. Faced with a similar failure to meet the requisite burden of proof, the United States
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
stated: "For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence that the financing system
discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute
deprivation of education-the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of indentification in
traditional terms." Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
14. Davis, Taxpaying Ability: A Study of the Relationship Between Wealth and Income in
California Counties, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEA TENTH CONFERENCE ON SCHOOL FINANCE 199-
203 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. In Kansas, to the extent that there is a relationship
between real property wealth and per capita income, it seems to be an inverse one See
Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 U. KAN. L.
REV. 213 (1972). See also Morris & Andrews, Ample Provision for Washington's Common
Schools: Northshore's Constitutional Promises to Keep, 10 GONZ. L. REv. 19, 22 nn. 13-16
(1974).
15. Berke & Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone orMillstonefor School Finance?, 21 J.
PUB. L. 23 (1972).
16. A report prepared by the Senate Office of Research, California State Legislature,
discloses the following information about the Average Daily Attendance (ADA) of students:
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The central concern of the court in Serrano 11 was equality of public
school resource deployment; 17 yet, at the urging of the plaintiffs, the court
dealt with this concern indirectly through the "proxy", or substitute, of
public school revenue production.18 It tacitly but erroneously assumed that a
system providing equality of revenue production will necessarily provide
equality of public school resource deployment. All other things being equal,
property-rich school districts can raise money for school purposes more
easily than property-poor school districts where state taxation of local real
property is a major source of local school revenue. 19 It is also true that both
the value of real property within a school district and the average daily
Ratio to
State Aver- Percent
age of children Median
Assessed Gross In- Below Assessed
Valuation Come Per Poverty Value of
Per ADA ADA (a) Level (b) Homes (c)
State
Aver-
ages $12,424 1.00 11.80 $ -
Emery
Unified
School
District 92,151 0.91 31.25 3,979
Piedmont
Unified
School
District 14,904 2.12 1.72 11,503
(a)-Income of families and unrelated individuals.
(b)-Children 6-17 years old from families below poverty level.
(c)-Single family residences.
See Senate Office of Research, Serrano Reform: Where Will the Money Go? 2 (1975). Thus,
when only real property assessed valuation is used as the standard for determining school
district wealth, the Emeryville school district, at nearly 71I2 times the state average, would be
considered extraordinarily wealthy. Yet, almost one-third of its students are below the
poverty level. On the other hand, the Piedmont school district is less than twenty percent above
the state average in property wealth but has more than twice the state average gross income per
ADA; less than two percent of its school children are below the poverty level. The report
summarizes its findings as follows: "There is little relationship between the AV/ADA [assessed
valuation/average daily attendance] of the school districts and the presence of children six to 1,7
years old from families earning less than the poverty level." Id. at 3-4.
17. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (1976).
18. An understanding of these two terms, "public school resource deployment" and
"public school revenue production," is central to an understanding of Serrano IL "Public
school revenue production" refers to the system of taxation employed by the state to raise
school revenues from taxpayers. "Public school resource deployment" refers to the system of
distributing school resources (or the money necessary to obtain them) to school districts and,
through those districts, to school children.
19. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 744-45, 557 P.2d at 937, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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attendance (ADA)20 of school children within that district are exogenous
variables over which the district can exercise no control. Yet, because these
two variables substantially determine the amount of money per ADA of a
school child available to the local school district for the deployment of
school resources, the plaintiffs in Serrano argued that the state's school
financing scheme placed an unfair tax burden on property-poor districts and
therefore created an inequitable distribution of school resources to such
districts. 21 These burdens result from accidents of geography, political
boundary decisions and private choices regarding real property devel-
opment. All of these factors make access to public educational resources
dependent upon the fortuitous aggregation of real property wealth within a
given school district. The plaintiffs argued that such a classification by
wealth violated the equal protection provisions of the California Constitu-
tion.22
By linking the concept of equitable taxation with that of equitable
school resource deployment, the plaintiffs in Serrano challenged the con-
stitutionality of the system of district revenue production as though they
were attacking the true concern, public school resource deployment. Indeed,
the court in Serrano I seemed concerned with resource deployment, not
revenue production, when it stated that "the school financing system before
the court fails to provide equality of treatment to all the pupils in the
state." 23 The fairness of a system of revenue production is not, however,
necessarily related to the central concern in Serrano, the fairness of a
system of school resource deployment. But because the plaintiffs' strategy
focused on the unequal burdens associated with revenue production, the role
of the local school district as tax collector was given a special and unde-
served prominence, and the relative real property wealth of each district
became the cynosure of the litigation. This is unfortunate for a number of
reasons.
First, as was discussed earlier,24 poor school children do not necessari-
ly reside in property-poor school districts. The purported correlation be-
tween property-rich districts and rich district residents seems to work well
enough when, as in Serrano, the Baldwin Heights and Beverly Hills
Unified School Districts are compared. But, the hypothesis cannot be
maintained when, for example, one looks at the San Francisco Unified
School District. In San Francisco, unlike Beverly Hills, the high assessed
valuation of real property per ADA. student is largely attributable to the
presence of substantial commercial and industrial development rather than
20. Average Daily Attendance is computed by adding together the number of students
actually present on each school day and dividing that total by the number of days school was
taught. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 592 n.4, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.4.
21. Brief for Plaintiffs at 182, Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
22. CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 7(a,b); art. 4, § 16.
23. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
24. See Davis, supra note 13.
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to that of highly assessed residential property values. By any standard, the
percentage of poor students in the San Francisco public schools is much
greater than that in Beverly Hills, though both districts are property-rich. z5
Moreover, some of the poorest people live in areas with some of the greatest
property wealth, e.g., next to factories or other commercial establishments.
To treat those people and theirschool children as rich because they live in
property-rich school districts and to penalize them for their unfortunate
residential location, as would be done under the district power equalizing
scheme advanced by the plaintiffs in Serrano I, would not only be unfair
but would also be at cross-purposes with the fundamental concern addressed
in the Serrano litigation, the conditioning of a school child's access to
necessary public school resources upon his family's or his school district
neighbors' wealth.
Second, defining wealth as real property asses sed valuation falls to take
into account those persons who own their own homes, but who are living on
modest incomes or pensions. Such people would not ordinarily be con-
sidered rich, although they would be treated as such for the purposes of a
definition that is grounded primarily on a measure of real property values.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Serrano, preoccupied with inter-district
wealth disparities, ignored the problem of municipal overburden 26 in their
quest for fiscal neutrality. This problem, which Serrano H leaves for the
legislature to solve,27 would not be solved by a district power equalizing
scheme.
C. Serrano H: An Unique Equal Protection Analysis
As has been suggested earlier, 28 equal access to educational resources
was held a fundamental interest by the court in Serrano f both because of
25. Information in the computer data base used by the California Senate Education
Committee indicates that for 1976 the San Francisco Unified School District had more than 2/2
times the statewide average real property assessed valuation (AV) per average daily attendance
(ADA) students, but thirty-five percent of San Francisco's students were from families below
the poverty level. In contrast, in the Beverly Hills Unified School District, which had more than
21h times the state average AV/ADA, less than one percent of the students were from families
below poverty level.
26. "Municipal tax overburden refers to high property tax rates for other governmental
services than education." Finding of Fact No. 174, Serrano v. Priest, Civ. No. 938254 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Aug. 30, 1974). A convenient way to think of municipal overburden is in relation to
the statewide average percent of local taxes that support local non-school governmental
functions, such as police, fire and related municipal services. Normalizing a community's
municipal non-school tax burden with respect to the state average provides a useful index of
overburden. For example, if the statewide average percentage of total local taxes that support
non-school local governmental services were fifty percent, then a school district in a communi-
ty that spent fifty percent of its local taxes on non-school local governmental services would
have a municipal overburden of 1.00 (0.50/0.50 = 1.00), or none. A district that had a municipal
burden of sixty percent would have a municipal overburden of 1.20 (0.60/0.50 = 1.20); whereas,
a district with a municipal burden of forty percent would have a municipal overburden of 0.80
(0.40/0.50 = 0.80), or an underburden of twenty percent compared to the state average.
27. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 759 n.38, 557 P.2d at 946, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
28. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
Summer 1977] EQUAL ACCESS TO SCHOOL RESOURCES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the individual benefits produced by education and because the state equal
protection clause requires the elimination of irrational and invidious legisla-
tive classifications. The proxy of school district real property wealth was
used by the Serrano plaintiffs to show that some property-poor school
districts must impose a relatively heavier tax burden on their residents in
order to provide their school children with adequate educational resources.
Thus, public school resource deployment was dealt with indirectly through a
constitutional challenge to the method of school revenue appropriation. The
present system of school finance in California was found to be unconstitu-
tional by the state supreme court because a school child's entitlement to a
public education is a "fundamental interest," and the state could show no
compelling justification for wealth-based discrimination in the production of
school resources. 29
It is important to examine this equal protection analysis carefully. The
court mandates equality of treatment because education is too vital to be
restricted in an unequal way; it is both a "major determinant of an individu-
al's chances for economic and social success," 3 and also a "unique
influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in
political and community life.''31 This justification for the court's analysis
depends upon the uniqueness and importance of what education does, upon
individual value judgments concerning the private benefits to the recipient
of education, and upon individual perceptions about the usefulness of
education in the context of a democratic government.
Compare this analysis with that utilized by the United States Supreme
Court in striking down, on equal protection grounds, a statute that allowed
whites only to be seated at the front of a municipal bus.32 There is nothing
inherently valuable about sitting anywhere on a bus. Racial discrimination
in seating was proscribed by the Court solely because equality is important
in itself, not because of the value to which equal access is given. Similarly,
the United States Supreme Court has held that no official encouragement of
discrimination results from the closing of public swimming pools, because
both black and white citizens are equally deprived of the use of the closed
facilities. 33
Underlying these decisions is the assumption that equal access to state-
provided opportunities, without regard to the intrinsic value of those oppor-
tunities, must be available to all without invidious or irrational distinctions.
There may be controversy in a particular case as to whether the classifica-
tions are invidious or irrational, but once courts determine that the classifi-
cations should be so characterized, then such classifications violate the
principle of equal protection. But the Supreme Court has not required that
29. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 776, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
30. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
31. Id., 487 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
32. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
33. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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the state make available public buses and public swimming pools. Those
things are not, as a matter of constitutional law, intrinsically valuable. The
court has merely said that if they are made available by the state, then they
must be made available to all without invidious discrimination, such as
those based on race, against potential users.
Serrano if is different in a crucial aspect from these federal decisions.
In Serrano H the right to an education was found to be a fundamental
interest because of the intrinsic value of education. The United States
Supreme Court would presumably allow California to close all public
swimming pools within the state rather than allow nonwhites freely to use
them. Access to public swimming pools is not safeguarded because swim-
ming is not constitutionally protected for its intrinsic value, either to the
swimmer or to society at large. But could the California legislature satisfy
the mandate of Serrano f by enacting a district power equalizing 34 statute,
abolishing the guaranteed basic aid 35 and equalization aid36 and limiting the
amount that could be raised with district power equalizing to $125 per ADA
of a student (the present level of basic aid) with no permitted voter override?
Such a school finance scheme, rather clearly, would no longer entail "the
conditioning of the availability of school revenues upon district wealth."
37
All districts, without regard to real property wealth, would be able to raise
$125 per ADA student with the same rate of local real property taxation.
Thus, in terms of strict equal protection analysis, all ADA students wherev-
er they attended school in California would be treated equally without regard
either to their own personal wealth or to the wealth of their school district.
This hypothesized financing scheme would, in all probability, violate
the mandate of the California Supreme Court because of the uniqueness and
importance of education, as announced in Serrano 1.38 It would be a cruel
hoax, indeed, to concede the intrinsic importance of education to individuals
and to society and to invoke the "compelling state interest" test because of
that importance, while simultaneously permitting the substantial deprivation
of access to an education as long as all those affected suffer equal but not
total deprivation. In fact, Serrano H stated that any school financing system
that conditioned "the availability of school revenues upon district wealth
. . .and. . . the dependency of the quality of education upon the level of
district expenditure-must be declared invalid unless it finds justification
sufficient to satisfy the applicable equal protection test." 39 Although this
language is dictum and the issues surrounding the latter point were neither
pleaded, argued nor proven at trial, this declaration clearly goes beyond the
34. See note 1 supra.
35. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
36. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
37. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 756, 557 P.2d at 944, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
38. "We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our
society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest.' "Serrano 1, 5 Cal.
3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
39. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 756, 557 P.2d at 944, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (emphasis added).
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strict equal protection principles utilized by the trial court.40 Because the
California Supreme Court did at least indicate a willingness to expand strict
equal protection analysis, it would appear that if a future case squarely
presents the question of'a constitutionally required "level of district expen-
diture", the court would require a minimum level of protection from the
state.
41
The California Supreme Court did not discuss the level of minimum
protection that may be constitutionally required, how that level should be
determined, or the nexus that must be shown to exist between school
expenditures and the quality of education. These are questions that have
been discussed, however, in Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington.42
In that case, petitioners alleged that the State of Washington was not
meeting its constitutional duty to make "ample provision" for the education
of its school children.43 The state moved for summary judgment, claiming,
inter alia, that there were no -judicially manageable standards for determin-
ing ampleness, citing Mclnnis v. Shapiro.' The motion was denied; after
nine weeks of trial the court held that the issue was judicially manageable 45
and that the state was not meeting its constitutional duty to make "ample
provision." It further declared that after July 1, 1979, the state, which was
40. The California Supreme Court noted the following statement by the trial court judge:
"What the Serrano court imposed as a California constitutional requirement is that there must
be uniformity of treatment between the children of the various school districts in the State
because all the children of the State in public schools are persons similarly circumscribed. The
equal-protection-of-the-laws provisions of the California Constitution mandate nothing less
than that all such persons shall be treated alike. If such uniformity of treatment were to result in
all children being provided a low-quality educational program, or even a clearly inadequate
educational program, the California Constitution would be satisfied. This court does not read
the Serrano opinion as requiring that there is any constitutional mandate for the State to
provide funds for each child in the State at some magic level to produce either an adequate-
quality educational program or a high-quality educational program. It is only a disparity in
treatment between equals which runs afoul of the California constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the laws." Id. at 754 n.28, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.28 (quoting
the trial court's memorandum opinion at 59) (emphasis in original).
41. Professor Michelman has proposed a minimum protection theory as an intepretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The analysis logically applicable to the equal protection
provision of the California Constitution. See Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
42. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, Civ. No. 53950 (Wash. Super. Ct., Jan. 14, 1977)
(memorandum of intended decision), appeal docketed, No. 44845 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Mar. 31,
1977).
43. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, Civ. No. 53950 at I (Wash. Super. Ct., Jan. 14,
1977) (memorandum of intended decision), appeal docketed, No. 44845 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Mar.
31, 1977). The Washington Constitution provides: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction
or preference on account of race, color, cast or sex." WASH. CONST. art. 9, § I.
44. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969). Mclnnis is discussed in Serrano L 5 Cal. 3d at 615-17, 487 P.2d at 1263-65, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 623-25.
45. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, Trial Judgment at 3, 6.
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already subsidizing more than fifty-eight percent of the Seattle district's
budget for the 1975-76 school year, 46 could no longer rely upon locally-
voted revenues to support those educational programs necessary for the state
to meet its constitutional duty. 47
The California Supreme Court will not be required to face the question
of the constitutional minimum of state-provided aid to education that arose
in Seattle unless the complaint in some future lawsuit shows a nexus
between the quality of education and the level of district expenditure.
48
Although full treatment of that important subject is beyond the scope of
these remarks, it should be noted that the use of econometric analysis
adapted to the presently inadequate standards for measuring educational
effectiveness will provide scant help but no significant harm to potential
plaintiffs. 49
46. FINAL BUDGET REPORT No. F 196, SEATrLE SCHOOL DISTRICr No. 1 (1975-76). Most of
the remaining maintenance and operation revenue is obtained by annual district elections that
authorize the taxing of the real property within the school district and the retention of all
revenue thereby accrued to operate the schools. This process is similar to the "override"
system in California.
47. In Seattle, the trial court filed its eighty-four page memorandum opinion on January
14, 1977. The 620 findings of fact and 67 conclusions of law and judgment were filed on March
17, 1977. Notice of appeal was filed by the State of Washington on March 31, 1977.
48. The question might arise in an action on behalf of students in a local school district
with a low annual educational expenditure, but in which district power equalizing makes
available to a local ADA student equal quantities of school dollars for each tax rate unit. In such
a case, if the district elected to have a very low tax rate and, therefore, a very low level of
district expenditure per ADA student, a lawsuit might be brought alleging that the quality of
education was unconstitutionally impaired because of the low level of district expenditure.
49. The attempt to quantify and predict the relationship between educational "inputs"
(e.g., student-teacher ratios, teaching techniques, student home environment, etc.) and educa-
tional "outputs" (e.g., student achievement, etc.) is a growing science. This science has
borrowed research techniques from the physical and biological sciences, most particularly
standard mutiple or linear regression analysis. Unfortunately, the underlying assumptions (and
assumptions must be made to employ this scientific technique) about the relationship between
educational inputs and outputs are often stated in the simplest of mathematical expressions,
even though educational researchers agree that the process of education is a complex and subtle
phenomenon. This use of simplistic formulae is usually justified by educational researchers on
two grounds. First, simple equations make manipulation of data easier. Second, since it is not
known whether other more complex mathematical formulae are any more likely to provide
correct descriptions of the education process, the simpler models are utilized. These studies
(often referred to as educational production function studies) have not yet provided much that
is useful either in assisting educational policy judgments or in guiding the courts or legislatures
in this area. One of the major flaws in these studies is that no confidence can be placed in
conclusions about the correlation or the lack of correlation between educational inputs and
educational outputs. This is because the assumptions implicit in the study as to the mathemat-
ical relationship among the variables (e.g., the assumption of linearity) are unverified. For
example, a showing of a low correlation between class size and student reading levels may be
due to the fact that these variables were weakly correlated or because the assumed mathemat-
ical nature of the relationship was incorrect. The independent variable (class size) and the
dependent variable (reading level) may, for example, be highly and positively correlated, but
that correlation would never be disclosed by an educational production function study based on
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II. Alternative Financing Schemes Suggested in Serrano H
Serrano 11 delineated several alternatives to the present financing
system that, in the court's view, represented constitutionally acceptable
solutions to the California school finance crisis:
These alternative methods, which are "workable, practical and
feasible," include: "(1) full state funding, with imposition of a
statewide property tax; (2) consolidation of the present 1,067
school districts into about five hundred districts, with boundary
realignments to equalize assessed valuations of real property
among all school districts; (3) retention of the present school dis-
trict boundaries but the removal of commercial and industrial pro-
perty from local taxation for school purposes and taxation of such
property at the state level; (4) school district power equalizing,
which has as its essential ingredient the concept that school dis-
tricts could choose to spend at different levels but for each level of
expenditure chosen the tax effort would be the same for each
school district choosing such level whether it be a high-wealth or a
low-wealth district; (5) vouchers; and (6) some combination of two
or more of the above. ' '50
The alternatives of district consolidation, removal of commercial and indus-
trial property from local taxation, and district power equalizing are unattrac-
tive solutions to the school funding crisis because they continue to treat as
one problem what in fact are two separate but related problems: revenue
production and public school resource deployment.51
A. District Consolidation
Even if consolidation created districts with essentially equal ratios of
real property assessed valuation per ADA student, it could not guarantee
that such tax parity would continue. Not only are demographic patterns
constantly changing, but real property also becomes more or less valuable as
development patterns change. Today's worthless desert is tomorrow's high-
valued shopping center or housing tract. While one school district experi-
ences a declining enrollment, an adjacent district may have a burgeoning
student population. Neither property values nor student population is within
the control of any school district. Thus, district consolidation would be a
an incorrect assumption about the relationship between class size and reading levels. Scientific
research in education is thus relatively undeveloped. Some of its early limitations derived from
the fact that the principal investigators were "educators," not scientists or mathematicians.
Increasingly, however, the investigators in educational research are becoming more sophis-
ticated in their understanding of the uses and limitations of their scientific tools. Thus, it can be
predicted with confidence that future research in this important area will be more careful, more
credible, and ultimately useful.
50. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55 (quoting the
trial court's finding of fact no. 198).
51. See notes 14-27 and accompanying text supra.
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stopgap measure at best, destined to fail in providing a lasting solution to the
school finance problem. Furthermore, the periodic realigning of school
district boundaries would cause considerable disruption in school attend-
ance. A student who formerly walked to a convenient local school might
find that he was assigned to a distant and inconvenient school when his
block was incorporated in a new district.
The apportionment and redistricting cases decided by the Supreme
Court in the 1960's52 are examples of the kind of problem that can and
should be avoided by the California legislature in its response to Serrano If.
The Court has faced unending difficulties in determining how much devia-
tion from mathematically equal representation is constitutionally permis-
sible.53 Where possible, the judiciary should be spared from having to
answer this type of question because numerically specific answers (other
than "zero") cannot justifiably be transformed into general and immutable
principles of law. Lacking the guidance of such principles, courts necessari-
ly decide cases in a haphazard fashion that creates more problems than it
resolves.
B. Restructuring the Commercial Tax Base
The alternative of retaining existing school district boundaries and
taxing commercial and industrial property at the state rather than at the local
level presents similar difficulties. A school district with a high average
assessed valuation of residential real property, such as the Beverly Hills
Unified School District, still maintains a substantial tax advantage over
school districts with a low average, such as the Baldwin Park Unified
School District. If the state-collected property tax were used to supplement
the locally-collected taxes in districts with low averages, the problem then
becomes one of how much the state subsidy should be. If the state subsidizes
districts so that they may all fund their programs at the level of the highest
district on an ADA student basis, then the result is essentially identical to
that achieved by full state funding. However, if the state subsidy is at some
lower level, the legislature may have difficulty harmonizing that decision
52. See, e.g., Lucas v. Colorado Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377
U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53. A deviation from mathematically equal representation of 16.4%, we are told, "may
well approach tolerable limits." Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973). In Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the maximum deviation was 7.83%. While not precisely
indicating the point at which a deviation from mathematical equality had to be affirmatively
justified by the state, the Court announced the de minimis standard in White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973) (maximum deviation was 9.9%). The Court in White said "[v]ery likely, larger
differences between districts would not be tolerable without justification. ... 412 U.S. at
764.
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with the mandate of the California constitution, particularly in light of the
trial court's findings. 54
C. District Power Equalizing
1. The Implicit Hypothesis
The alternative of district power equalizing (DPE), which the plaintiffs
in Serrano favored, is a concept that has been most forcefully advocated
in recent years by Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman.5 5 It cannot,
however, fulfill the requirement of optimum public school resource deploy-
ment and should be abandoned as a vehicle for determining the quality of
education within the local school districts of California.
There are many laudatory things to be said about DPE, especially when
it is compared with the present system of school financing in California and
most other states. But notwithstanding plaintiffs' protests to the contrary, 56
DPE focuses essentially upon tax equity (equalization of tax burdens in
regard to rate of tax assessed) and not upon the equalization of educational
opportunity, the problem involved in Serrano f. 51 Ibe hypothesis implicit
in the DPE strategy is that if the property tax burden of local voters,
measured in terms of the amount of money that can be raised per ADA
student for each dollar of tax levied locally per one hundred dollars of
assessed valuation (AV) within the school district, is the same for all voters
and all school districts throughout the state (regardless of the actual ratio of
AV/ADA within a school district), then the local political process and the
local concern for adequate training will assure the quality of education5 8
within the school districts. 59 This hypothesis is interesting, but the proposed
financing system built upon it is rife with shortcomings.
54. Among the trial court's findings of fact in Serrano I are the following:
"No. 214. The quality of education provided by a school district to its pupils is signifi-
cantly affected and improved by any increase in per pupil expenditures.
No. 215. The level of expenditures per pupil and the ability of a district to provide a given
measure of quality of school offerings are directly related.
No. 236. The amount of money available to a school district affects the quality of
education being offered because facilities, equipment, supplies and services in the form of
teachers and other employees, all require expenditures and, if expenditures are restricted
because of an absence of funds, the educational program in a district will necessarily be
impaired."
55. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
56. See Brief for Respondents at 84-85, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1976).
57. See note 23, and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 39, and accompanying text supra.
59. See Brief of The Childhood and Government Project as Amicus Curiae, Serrano II, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). "The relevant wealth is always district
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2. The Shortcomings of a DPE Scheme Based on Property Values
One major shortcoming of DPE as a mechanism for removing wealth-
related disparities in per-pupil expenditures is the lack of a demonstrably
strong correlation between assessed valuation of real property per ADA
student and individual wealth.60 More important, however, DPE simply
does not take into account enough different factors to offer a feasible
alternative to the evils inherent in the present system of school financing.
The main evil to be eliminated is the conditioning of a school child's access
to essential public school resources upon his family's or his school district
neighbors' individual wealth, not just property wealth.
The assessed valuation of real property per ADA student is an impor-
tant term in the calculus of a local school district's revenue production
capacity, but it is not the only nor the most important term. 61 District power
equalizing does not take into account wealth-related disparities in expendi-
ture that are not property wealth related. It is true, for example, that under
the DPE scheme advanced by the amici in Serrano,62 all who own a
residence valued at $40,000 would receive for their local schools the same
amount of money per ADA student for every dollar of tax assessed per
hundred dollars of assessed valuation. But taxes are paid with individual
wealth (usually personal income), not property wealth. Because there is no
positive correlation in California school districts between individual wealth
and real property wealth, the average ability of local taxpayers in any given
district to pay the same level of tax varies widely. It is one thing, for
example, to ask a family of four with an annual income of $20,000 and a
single family residence assessed at $10,00063 to pay a school tax of five
wealth-assessed valuation per pupil. It is the right to public education that is affected, and
even the richest individual cannot purchase it. The only purchaser is that state-created entity
called the school district whose taxable property per pupil is, therefore, the relevant measure of
wealth. Thus, Serrano is not a poor man's complaint. The individual poor, to be sure, are the
most poignant victims of the present system because they cannot escape to private schools; but
the children of families living in poor districts all suffer from under financed schools irrespec-
tive of their family's income level." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
60. See notes 14 & 16 supra.
61. For example, in the 1970-71 school year the highest spending unified school district in
the grouping of school districts with the lowest ratio of AVIADA spent more per ADA student
than the lowest spending unified school district in the grouping of school districts with the
highest ratio of AV/ADA. See Defendant's Exhibit L-4, Serrano v. Priest, Civ. No. 938254
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1974). The significance of this statistic is that other factors, unrelated to local
school district real property AWADA, have a significant effect on local decisions concerning
school revenue production.
62. See note 55 supra.
63. In California, real property is assessed for tax purposes at 25% of true value. CAL.
REV. & TAX CODE § 401 (West Supp. 1977). Thus, a $40,000 lot would have an assessed
valuation of $10,000. Also, "modified assessed valuation" (MAV) rather than "assessed
valuation" (AV) is the standard measure of property wealth. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41200-
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dollars per hundred dollars AV, but it is quite another matter to ask a similar
family with an annual income of only $10,000 to pay the same rate and the
same total tax on a $10,000 AV residence, even when the latter is guaran-
teed through DPE the same revenue per ADA student as that promised to the
former.64
It is elementary that a unit of wealth does not have the same value for
everyone, 65 nor does one value the last unit of wealth to the same degree as
the first. What is most troublesome about this fact in the context of school
finance is not only that wealth-based choices under a DPE system would
continue to influence strongly local educational resource deployment
choices, but also that those most directly harmed by this continuing wealth-
based decisional calculus are not the decision-makers but are rather their
children. 66
41206 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly at id. §§ 17261-17265 (West Supp. 1977)). The
"modification" is a device to encourage, through a kind of tax penalty for noncompliance,
school districts to become "unified" school districts. Because for present purposes the distinc-
tion between MAV and AV is unimportant, that distinction has been ignored in this commen-
tary.
64. See Plaintiff's Exhibit I at 95, and Defendant's Exhibit L-1 at 560 and 871, Serrano v.
Priest, Civ. No. 938254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1974). The cited pages disclose the following data:
MAV/ADA* MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
Santa Monica
Unified School District $29,800 $10,800
Palos Verdes Peninsula
Unified School District $12,200 $21,100
* Modified assessed valuation per average daily attendance students (see note 63
supra).
This comparison illustrates further the extreme likelihood of continuing wealth-related
disparities between school districts in per-pupil expenditures if a DPE system of school
financing is adopted. If district wealth were predicated upon the assessed valuation of real
property within the district, Santa Monica is nearly 2'12 times as wealthy as Palos Verdes
Peninsula. Yet, in terms of median family taxable income, Palos Verdes is nearly twice as
wealthy as Santa Monica. Under a DPE system, one might expect the relatively richer Palos
Verdes residents to be subsidized by the revenues raised at the expense of the poorer Santa
Monica residents.
65. Those with greater disposable income relative to their fixed and irreducible basic
expenses place a lesser value on having a relatively large number of dollars that are disposable
in a discretionary way than those enjoying less disposable income. Because this is so it cannot
be expected that both groups will choose to spend the same number of dollars for education,
even if each dollar has the same purchasing power. In fact, the less affluent group would have
to accord education a higher priority than the more affluent group in order for the former to
make the commitment to spend the same amount of dollars as the latter. For the less affluent,
that same amount of dollars would represent a greater percentage of their discretionary
disposable income that must be spent for education.
66. Respondents commented: "Defendants would attempt to treat tax inequity in the
abstract as if it can be treated separately from spending inequity but one cannot look at one
without looking at the other. Wealth, tax rates, and spending are inextricably tied together. The
tax rate is merely the device through which assessed wealth has its impact upon spending, for
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District power equalizing, which requires majority approval of local
residents to obtain a guaranteed revenue, also does not take into account the
impact of important community characteristics that affect school support,
such as the percentage of the electorate that is unmarried or married but
childless, the educational background of the parents of school-age children,
or the costs of other local government services. 67 A related problem of DPE
is that to the extent it makes education a matter of local determination, it
allows property-rich districts to escape, at least in part, the intended purpose
of the financing system, i.e., the removal of local property wealth from the
exclusive use of the district in which it is found.
District power equalizing also encourages an unintended extension of
the definition of education in property-poor districts, an extension sub-
sidized by the property wealth located and taxed elsewhere. One might
expect, for example, that property-rich districts would define education
narrowly because a portion of the revenues raised for education therein
would actually flow to other districts. To minimize this tax dollar drain, a
self-serving property-rich district might exclude from its school programs all
drama, art, music, physical education, interscholastic competitive sports,
science clubs, and foreign language programs that are not mandated by the
state and divert the money thereby saved to, for example, local community
recreation and park budgets. Such a tactic would permit both local property
taxation and local retention of revenues thereby raised, because only school
revenues would be district power equalized. On the other hand, property-
poor districts that would receive more than one dollar in value for every
dollar that they taxed themselves could be expected to expand their def-
inition of education to include more elaborate educational and related
the lower a district's wealth, the higher its tax rate must be in order to raise a given amount of
revenue." Brief for Respondents at 85, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976). In fact, tax inequity can and should be treated separately from spending inequity
(resource deployment). We treat these two concerns quite separately at the federal level. For
example, when the federal government is concerned with revenue production through the
vehicle of the graduated net income tax the concern is with what graduation structure, what
exemptions, etc., are fair for those producing the taxable revenue. But these concerns are not
confused, as the Serrano plaintiffs would require, with the separate subject of how this
revenue, once collected, should be distributed. It is true that wealth, tax rates, and spending are
inextricably tied together but only in the ultimate sense that unless the government prints its
own money, it ought not spend more than it collects.
67. In the 1970-71 school yea', for example, the school districts of Berkeley, Palo Alto and
Pasadena were, respectively, the fourth, eighth, and twenty-first highest spending districts per
ADA student in California. Yet in rank order of their real property wealth they were, respec-
tively, seventy-fifth, fifty-sixth, and ninety-fifth. Plaintiff's Exhibit 100 and Defendant's Ex-
hibit H-5, Serrano v. Priest, Civ. No. 938254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1974). The proximity of colleges
and universities in the midst of these school districts coupled with their higher than average
median family incomes probably explains their extraordinarily high school expenditures, rela-
tive to their relatively low real property wealth.
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programs such as free hot breakfasts, psychological counseling, medical
aid, disease inoculation, or dental hygiene. Moreover, in school districts
where real property assessed valuation is high relative to the DPE neutral
point but where median family income is relatively low,6" more money
would be generated by taxes than would be retained locally, in spite of the
fact that the burden on income to raise such revenues in those districts is
disproportionately large. This fact could be expected to dampen the en-
thusiasm in such districts for needed school programs, even to the point that
local DPE tax measures might not pass at all.
3. The Shortcomings of a Modified DPE Scheme
Of course, a system of district power equalizing could be devised
which is based on median family income per ADA student in a district, or a
combination of an income-wealth base and a property-wealth base. But even
that modification and improvement should not be used as a device for
producing necessary school resources because it, like a real property-based
DPE, would only become part of a patchwork solution to the overall school
financing problem; school revenue appropriation would continue to be
contingent upon the non-school values of local communities. Thus, in
communities with a high proportion of single adults, elderly persons, and
childless couples, such as San Francisco, the value placed on raising school
resources would be less than that exhibited by communities with low
proportions of the same demographic subgroups. An income-based DPE
would also continue to permit the scope of education to be determined at the
local level, and thus would encourage the same sort of definitional manipu-
lation by both income-rich and income-poor districts that exists in a real
property-based DPE system. 69
4. DPE and The Problem of Municipal Overburden
Whether a DPE system used real property or income as a wealth
criterion or some combination of the two, it would not deal with the serious
problem of municipal overburden.70 In Serrano II the plaintiff-respondents
argued:
Appellants assert that a fiscally neutral school financing sys-
tem in which districts get equal revenue for equal tax effort would
be unfair to districts like San Francisco which has high property tax
rates for governmental services other than education. This addi-
tional tax burden is often referred to as "municipal overburden."
Yet, again, appellants ignore the trial court finding that
municipal tax overburden occurs in low wealth, low spending dis-
68. See notes 16, 64 and 65 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
70. See note 26 supra.
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tricts just as it does in high wealth, high spending districts ...
No reason exists why San Francisco ought to have an advantage
over Los Angeles or San Diego from the standpoint of municipal
overburden. Both before and after S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267, high
wealth, high spending districts are financially better able to address
the problem of municipal tax overburden than are low wealth, low
spending districts. . . . That is a complete response to appellant's
argument. 71
In fact, the response is less than complete. It is true that no reason exists
why San Francisco ought to have an advantage over Los Angeles or San
Diego with respect to municipal overburden, but it is equally true that San
Francisco and other high-wealth, high municipal overburden districts should
not be unduly penalized by a DPE system. Yet, unless further adjustments
are made to the basic DPE model, low-wealth districts with high municipal
overburden would enjoy an unfair advantage similar to that now enjoyed by
high-wealth, high municipal overburden districts.
District power equalizing cannot solve the problem of municipal over-
burden. It can only increase the burden for high-wealth districts that already
experience it, while decreasing the burden for low-wealth districts. To the
extent that the poor are found in high-wealth districts, their problems are
further exacerbated by this flaw in DPE. The reason why property-based
DPE would intensify the municipal overburden of a high property wealth
district with a high municipal overburden, such as San Francisco, is readily
apparent. With fierce competition for local tax dollars among other govern-
mental needs, a school district in a community with a high municipal
overburden has a difficult struggle to raise needed educational revenues. If
the high municipal overburden school district is also a property-rich district,
the problem of overburden is less than that confronted in an average wealth
or property-poor district because in the property-rich district a school tax of
one dollar per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation will buy more
resources per ADA student. All other things being equal, this means that the
high property wealth district can impose a lower rate of local school tax than
a low wealth district could; for this reason, other governmental services may
take a disproportionately larger share of a property-rich district's local tax
revenues without significantly harming its school program. In other words,
being a high property wealth district partially compensates for being a
district with a high municipal overburden.
Under a property-based DPE system, however, a high-wealth, high
municipal overburden district could not maintain the same level of school
spending per ADA student with the same tax rate it had imposed prior to
DPE. Thus, in a district such as San Francisco, either total local taxes would
71. Respondents' Brief at 84, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976).
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have to be increased in an amount corresponding to the assessed valuation
discount built into the DPE system, or school revenues (or other governmen-
tal revenues) would have to be reduced. On the other hand, low-wealth,
high municipal overburden districts existing within a property-based DPE
system would compete more favorably with other local governmental tax
needs than they do at present, because a lower rate of local school tax would
be sufficient to produce the same revenue per ADA student as existed before
DPE. Thus, looking to the needs of both high-wealth and low-wealth
districts, the serious problem of municipal overburden is not treated any
more satisfactorily under a property-based DPE system than it is under the
present system of school financing in California.
5. DPE and the Need for Centralized Fiscal Planning
Considered from the perspective of California state fiscal planners,
DPE presents further unattractive features. Those having the responsibility
for drafting the state's annual budget will be unenthusiastic about DPE
because it would be very difficult to forecast how much of the program the
state will have to finance from the non-school revenues in the state's general
fund. Ideally, the local revenues produced by taxes in high-wealth districts
that exceed the amount per local ADA student that the DPE system allows
to be retained would be redistributed throughout the state to those low-
wealth districts that raised insufficient revenue to meet the amount per local
ADA student guaranteed under the DPE system for that tax rate. In such a
situation, the state would act merely as a conduit and no additional state
revenues would be called upon to meet the DPE guarantee to local school
districts.
Unfortunately, California is not the fiscal planner's ideal world. It is
impossible to predict from year to year the degree to which the high-wealth
districts would produce revenues that could be used by the state to under-
write the shortfall in the low-wealth districts. This uncertainty could require
substantial uncommitted reserves in the state general fund to underwrite the
DPE program to the extent that it does not internally generate sufficient
revenues of its own. Of course, state planners could set the DPE dollar
guarantee per local ADA student at a very conservative level to hedge
against the state's need to underwrite the DPE program from other state
revenues. But such fiscal conservatism would frustrate the collective local
desire to allocate resources for public education. As the burden on school
revenue production increases, the capacity of taxpayers to bear that burden
diminishes. If an additional onus was placed upon local school revenue
production in order to hedge against the state's need to supplement the DPE
guarantee from other sources, the underlying purpose of DPE would be
distorted in order to diminish the large fiscal uncertainty that DPE had
created at the state level.
L .....
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It would be possible for the state to require all school districts to pass
their local school tax measures for the succeeding fiscal year in advance,
based upon the state's tentative schedule of DPE guarantees for that year.
The state could then change the DPE guarantee schedule after all local
school district tax rates were promulgated.72 Under such an arrangement,
the state could know what its underwriting costs would be in any given fiscal
year before it irrevocably pledged itself to fund the program. If the costs
were too great, the state could simply reduce its DPE guarantee to an
acceptable level. But such a system would be inadvisable because local
school districts could never be confident that their tentative DPE budgets
would in fact become their actual budgets. If the state mandated a reduction
of the DPE guarantee, all local school budgets would have to be reduced.
Such an inherently uncertain financing system is simply impossible to
administer.
D. Vouchers
The fifth financing alternative suggested by Serrano I is that of
vouchers. 73 It is perhaps the least attractive option available to the California
legislature. This is so not because it is an alternative without merit but
because it would represent the most radical departure from the present
system and because it is a largely untested technique in California. Legis-
lators tend to eschew unfamiliar or untried alternatives. For these reasons, a
voucher system is unlikely to be adopted.
HI. A Proposed Legislative Response to Serrano II
My proposed solution to the problem of school financing in California
is a variant of the sixth alternative broached in Serrano 11, namely, some
combination of the other five options. It would consist of both full state
funding to meet the basic educational needs of school children and a
radically modified system of local power equalizing.
A. Full State Funding
The first alternative suggested in Serrano 11, full state funding, has so
many attractive features that it forms the basis of the school financing
72. The state could also require all local school districts to submit to the state their
proposed tax rates so that the state could commit itself irrevocably to a schedule of DPE
guarantees. But such a scheme would also be unsatisfactory because there would be no way of
knowing in advance which district voters would pass their tax requests and which would not.
73. Under a voucher plan, the state would give a student's parents a voucher i.e., a
certificate indicating that an approved school may present it to the state and collect cash in the
amount shown on its face, that may be used at any designated institution for the cost of the
child's education. Under a pure voucher system, schools would receive no funds from the state
except those tendered to it as vouchers by parents who chose to enroll their children there. See
generally C. JENCKS, EDUCATION VOUCHERS (1970); A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERI-
CAN EDUCATION (1974).
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system suggested here. The imposition of a statewide property tax has
much to recommend it74 because, unlike DPE, it allows for separate and
consequently more effective treatment of the two distinct problems in school
finance-revenue production and educational resource deployment. Full
state funding would also provide reliable, predictable annual revenues
because there would be no local voter discretion to approve or disapprove a
given taxing measure. Such a financing system would also negate the
importance of the location and the value of taxable real property in the state,
at least for educational revenue purposes. Moreover, under a system of full
funding, the state could simply levy a property tax that would produce all
revenues necessary to subsidize the schools. Having collected the revenues
under that procedure, the state could then distribute funds to local school
districts on the sole basis of need.
Full state funding for the basic educational needs of all students also
overcomes many of the other objections raised against district power
equalizing. A school district that contains some pupils whose educational
needs differ from the student norm in various degrees usually finds that the
cost of meeting those needs is disproportionately higher on a per pupil basis
than the cost incurred in educating its student population generally. If a
system of full state funding were employed to meet the basic educational
needs of all students, those additional intradistrict costs could be identified
and compensated for in the state revenue distribution formula through which
the local school district received its subsidies.75 If a system for full state
74. One of the most commonly voiced criticisms of full state funding is the fear that local
control will be supplanted. It is said that if local voters cannot determine the amount of revenue
produced to maintain and operate their schools, they will lose control over the content,
character and requirements of the educational process. This criticism is only partially correct.
One of the present political realities is that the constituencies of all school districts want strong
local control. But these are the same constituencies that elect state legislators. Consequently, it
seems unlikely that the state legislature would intrude significantly into the operation of local
schools or allow other state agencies to do so. On the other hand, in California the state has an
obligation to guarantee the fundamental interest of education and, for this reason, it might
legitimately impose upon local school districts. Such an action is an intrusion upon local
control, but deference to the concept of local control should not excuse the failure of a school
district to provide the minimum educational program its school children need. A child's
fundamental interest in an adequate education is undermined both when district voters and the
state, acting upon the principle of local control, fail to provide such a program. Serrano II
would not permit the quality of education to be impaired by the level of district expenditure
even if a low expenditure level were approved by the district's electorate. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d
at 755-56, 557 P.2d at 944, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
75. One method by which the state might take into account the increased costs attendant
to educating students with special educational needs is to "weight" students according to those
special needs and provide revenue to local school districts on the basis of its total number of
"weighted" students. For example, if the state recognized that students from families below
the poverty level had greater educational needs than their peers, students who fit that descrip-
tion could be given an extra numerical weighting-say 0.5. Thus, one such child, assuming he
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funding of the basic educational needs of all students were implemented in
California, it would be relatively simple to take into account such important
local factors as municipal overburden, regional variations in the consumer
price index, differences in personnel experience and expertise, 76 intradistrict
transportation requirements, 77 and economies of scale. 78 These factors may
be easily and precisely accounted for in fairly disbursing money to a school
district where full state funding is employed. Rather than being impaired by
such variables, a full state financing scheme would neutralize their effect on
local school resource deployment. Moreover, full state funding of basic
educational needs would assure that local communities could not allow their
non-educational priorities to supersede the requirement for full support of
the basic educational needs of local students. 79
B. Neighborhood Power Equalizing
In addition to providing fair and reliable means for school revenue
production and school resource utilization, the state has a responsibility to
assure that school children are being adequately and effectively educated.
Members of the local community, however, often demand the authority to
fashion and administer local school programs. These two interests can be
accommodated through the vehicle of neighborhood power equalizing
(NPE).80
also did not fit additional weighting categories, would count as 1.5 children for the purposes of
distributing state funds to his local school district. If the state provided funding to local school
districts at the rate of $1,000 per "weighted" pupil, the school district in this example would
receive $1,500 for this one student. Another method would be to guarantee full state funding for
a certain ratio of staff and nonsalary items per "weighted" student. Whatever the method used,
full state funding of a student's basic educational needs would constitute the optimum tech-
nique for providing the funding adequate to fulfill the educationally diverse needs of students,
wherever they are found.
76. One of the substantial fiscal burdens that urban and adjacent suburban school districts
bear is the high level of experience and professional preparation of their teaching staff. In
California, a teacher's salary increases proportionately with the number of years that the
teacher has been teaching and the level of formal education achieved by that teacher. Because
urban and suburban communities have been viewed as desirable "destination" points by
teachers, they tend to retain teaching positions in those communities for durations significantly
longer than the statewide average. This means that teacher and administrative salaries in urban
and suburban school districts are generally higher than the statewide average.
77. The transportation requirements of school districts vary widely. Districts that are
relatively compact often have minimal transportation needs. In contrast, rural and sparsely
populated districts depend heavily upon busing, which can be very expensive. School districts
which are racially segregated may become substantially dependent upon large scale busing.
78. The smaller and more remote the school district, the higher its per student ADA costs
are likely to be. On the other hand, some districts, because they are'so large, have diseconomies
of scale for the reason that they cannot be managed with optimum efficiency. Each of these
problems can be dealt with specifically under a full state funding scheme.
79. See note 73 supra.
80. Under an NPE system, each geographical area within a school district that constitutes
the attendance area of a high school (and the elementary, middle, and junior high schools that
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Once the basic educational needs of all students are assured through
full state funding, local luxuries and nonessential programs 8' can be funded
serve it) would become a separate taxing entity for the purpose of allowing voters in that area tio
determine whether they wish to tax themselves in order to provide desired, but nonessential,
programs for their children. The underlying premise is that a smaller school district unit is better
suited to achieve the twin goals of local control and local performance auditing by the state. The
neighborhood high school attendance area is probably the smallest taxing district which is
practical. A taxing district that separately encompassed elementary, middle, and junior high
schools would be overlapped by the larger neighborhood high school serving them, causing an
undesirable multiplicity of taxing entities.
The interplay between the state and the neighborhood school is not new in California. The
Early Childhood Education (ECE) program in California presently operates in the early primary
grades. Under this program, state money is made available to a school building within a district
in order to implement some plan agreed upon by the State Department of Education, the
neighborhood parents, the teachers, and the school administrators working in that local build-
ing. The state then evaluates the performance of that program to determine whether the
subsidization will continue. The ECE program gives state authorities direct involvement with
neighborhood school operation and allows the individual school wide latitude to implement
particular educational programs while simultaneously providing the state with a direct means of
influencing local school choices so as to assure more effective learning opportunities for school
children.
81. Precisely what constitutes the "basic educational needs" of students as distinguished
from "local luxuries and nonessential programs" is currently a matter of spirited, albeit
confused, debate in the Washington state legislature, which is attempting to carry out the
mandate of the trial court in the Seattle case. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra. One
definitional approach would be to classify students on the basis of their learning potential.
Having decided upon appropriate broad classifications, testable substantive skills and levels of
competencies that students in each of these categories could reasonably be expected to exhibit
at specified grade levels and upon high school graduation could be set. Then, the public school
resource deployments (as exemplified by such measures as student/teacher ratios, the number
and variety of course offerings and textbooks, the presence of learning resource centers in
schools, etc.) that are, on a statewide average, being utilized to foster substantive skills and
optimum competency levels in students could be used by the state legislature as a basis for
setting levels of funding necessary to provide for the basic educational needs of all school-
children. Having determined the numbers of children fitting within each categQry in each
district and the expense of meeting their particular needs, the state could then disburse to each
district the amount of revenue necessary to provide for the basic educational requirements of
all students in that district. Once the local school district received such state-provided funds,
however, it should be under no obligation actually to utilize school resources in any preordained
fashion. Rather, the local school district should have the freedom to experiment within its
program. Accountability for the effective use of state funds could be maintained by annual
state-administered student testing. As long as a local school district's students were progressing
in a statistically satisfactory way in terms of their acquisition of skills and proficiency levels,
the district would have fulfilled its obligation to spend its state-provided funds wisely, and no
further accounting by it would be necessary. Where aggregate student progress in a district does
not meet established expectations, further involvement of the state Superintendent of Public
Instruction in that district's educational program could be required until student performance
levels conform with the requisite criteria; at that juncture, the local district could regain total
autonomy over the administration of its programs.
Local luxuries and nonessential programs would comprise those programs and school
related experiences which go beyond what is necessary to provide students with the substantive
skills and competency levels already established as necessary to prepare them for adult life.
Such programs and experiences would, if provided, add to and enrich student education. Their
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by discretionary local efforts.12 These nonessential programs, if limited to a
fixed percentage of the regular school program budget, can be prevented
from seriously distorting the range of programs and educational opportuni-
ties offered among school districts. 83 The proposed NPE formula can be
mathematically represented as follows:
84
1 + K1 (MOx - MO) K2 (CPI. - CPIs)MOs  CPIs
ATYo = BTYs M
(AFIADA). x(MAV/ADA)xL (AFADA), (MAV/ADA) j
In the context of this equation, "ATYxo" means the actual tax yield in
dollars per ADA student for any neighborhood "x" which votes to tax its
real property at tax rate "n". "BTYs." means the tax yield in dollars per
ADA student for the average state school community, having the average
state municipal overburden, the average state consumer price index, the
average state family income per ADA student, the average state modified
absence would not seriously disadvantage high school graduates as they chose from among the
array of further caieer and life opportunities. Swahili, Swedish, ethnomusicology, calligraphy,
film making, pottery, or football, for example, might be characterized as local luxuries and
nonessential programs to be funded by locally-voted tax measures in an NPE system.
82. This approach assures that sufficient financial resources will be available to meet the
essential educational needs of students, regardless of local sentiment concerning those needs or
local desires to tax at a sufficient rate to meet those needs. Only the revenues that would be
used for educational programs and services that go beyond the basic educational needs of
students would be subject to local voter approval.
83. Where NPE is used, the maximum district percentage of the annual regular program
budget could be the base for determining the pro rata share allocable to the neighborhood
school within that district. This pro rata distribution could be based upon the ratio of the
neighborhood school's ADA students to the district ADA population, or a "weighted" ADA
student ratio could be employed. A maximum NPE supplemental budget for a school district
might range between ten and twenty percent of the regular district budget that is supported by
full state funding.
84. The equation shown is intended merely to illustrate the concept and to show how the
important wealth-related factors can be dealt with. There are other terms that could be added to
the equation to refine it and make it more useful. Also, a sophisticated and more practical
equation would probably employ nonlinear coefficients in place of K, and K2 , where the
coefficients themselves were a function of some of the variable terms in the equation.
It is true that the equation shown above relies upon the average values of independent
variables and thus to some extent, like district power equalizing, does not accommodate ideally
each voter who makes up those average values. But, unlike DPE, this equation takes into
account the many variables that affect the calculus of voter decision-making rather than being
limited to only one variable (average real property wealth). More importantly, under the system
proposed, the criticisms of DPE (see text accompanying notes 60-72 supra), to the extent that
they might apply to NPE, become de minimus because NPE-financed school programs are by
definition nonessential.
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assessed valuation per ADA student and taxing its real property at tax rate
"n". The term "MOx" refers to the municipal overburden for neighbor-
hood "x," expressed as the ratio of that neighborhood's total governmental
nonschool costs to total governmental costs. This ratio would be the same
for each neighborhood within a given school district. "MOs" refers to the
statewide average municipal overburden. The figure "CPIx" is the consum-
er price index for neighborhood "x"; this index figure would also be the
same for each neighborhood within a given school district. Similarly, the
figure 'CPIs" is the statewide average consumer price index.
"(AFI/ADA)x" means the average family income per average daily attend-
ance of students in neighborhood "x" and "(AFI/ADA)," is the statewide
average family income per average daily attendance of students. While
"(MAV/ADA)x" refers to the modified assessed valuation per average daily
attendance of students in the neighborhood "x", "(MAy/ADA)s" is the
statewide average modified assessed valuation per average daily attendance.
Finally, "KI" and "K 2" are dimensionless constant coefficients of a
numerical value to be determined in applying the NPE formula.
In this equation, a local municipal overburden greater than the state
average causes the local actual tax yield to increase beyond the base tax
yield; the converse is also true. This relationship between municipal over-
burden and actual tax yield recognizes the increased onus on districts with
high municipal overburden (whether they are high-wealth or low-wealth
districts) and compensates for it. It likewise compensates for variations
around the state in the consumer price index, recognizing that areas with
higher indices need more money to obtain the same value than areas with
lower indices. Where income wealth increases as compared to the state
average, the equation takes this into account by providing less than the base
tax yield. This is a recognition of the fact that those communities with
higher income wealth can pay higher effective taxes to obtain the locally
desired benefit. Where a community has lower than average income, the
equation increases the actual tax yield beyond the base tax yield. The same
holds true in the case of real property assessed valuation per local ADA
student. Where there is a higher than average local assessed valuation, the
actual tax yield is diminished from the base tax yield and vice versa.8 5
85. By way of example, suppose the Base Tax Yield for a tax rate of $1.00$100 assessed
valuation was $500 (BTYS, = $500), constant coefficients K, and K2 had values of 2 and 3,
respectively, and the remaining state-related variables had the following values:
MOs = 1.00
CPIs = 1.00
(AFI/ADA), = $5,000
(MAV/ADA)s = $70,000
A neighborhood high school taxing district "X" that voted to tax itself for school purposes at
the rate of one dollar per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation would have an Actual Tax
Yield (ATYx,) of $665.00 per ADA student (33% higher than the Base Tax Yield), if its
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California could encourage improvements in the basic educational
program in local school districts, which would be fully state funded, by
requiring certain educational reforms in the basic program in the neighbor-
hood school as a condition precedent to that neighborhood school's partici-
pation in supplemental programs financed by NPE. This interrelationship
would achieve and perpetuate an important interchange between local ad-
ministration and control of education in each school building, and state
supervision of and assistance to local schools.
Conclusion
The court in Serrano if failed to treat the problems of public school
revenue production and public school resource deployment separately. As a
result, it neglected to analyze fully the issues it 'faced. In addition, the
alternative financing schemes announced by the trial court and adopted by
the state supreme court do not, on the whole, offer a sufficient means to
resolve the school financing crisis.
In responding to the mandate of Serrano 1, the California legislature
should eliminate the "inferior state school," 8 6 provide equitable tax bur-
dens, equitable educational opportunities and enhance local control at the
most local level-the neighborhood school. These multiple goals can be
best achieved by combining, with the indicated modifications, full state
funding and local power equalizing. It is this proposal that offers a needed
alternative to the device of district power equalizing favored by the plaintiffs
in Serrano ff.
Municipal Overburden (MO.) was 1.20, its Consumer Price Index (CPI.) was 1.10, its ratio of
Average Family Income to Average Daily Attendance (AFI/ADA)x was $3,000/student, and its
ratio of Modified Assessed Valuation to Average Daily Attendance (MAV/ADA)X was
$150,000/student. In another example, a neighborhood high school taxing district "X" that
voted a $1.00/$100 assessed valuation tax would have an Actual Tax Yield (ATYX,) of only
$37.50 per ADA student (7.5 percent of the Base Tax Yield) if its MO. = 0.80; CPI,, = 1.10,
(AFI/ADA). = $20,000; and (MAV/ADA)X = $210,000.
It should be stressed, however, that these two examples are provided only to demonstrate
how the equation might operate to compensate for various levels and kinds of wealth in the
neighborhood high school taxing district in an NPE system. The final form of the equation, the
numerical values assigned to the coefficient terms, and the schedule of Base Tax Yield for
various levels of tax rates could only be determined after a thorough investigation of California
tax data.
86. See text accompanying note 3 supra.

